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ceutical initial public offering firms. We examine the nature of the relationship between the
acquiring firm and the acquired initial public offering firm prior to the acquisition and from the
perspective of the resource‐based view. We find to some extent that firm specific‐resources
affect the prospect that the firm will be acquired. Furthermore, our findings show that firms with
more of these types of resources are likely to be acquired by firms engaged in co‐opetition rather
than by firms engaged solely in collaboration, competition, or (to a limited extent) with no prior
relationship.1 | INTRODUCTION
The present paper examines the understudied area of how the
resources associated with a firm that has recently gone public affects
the likelihood of that firm being acquired and who is acquiring it. Firm
mergers and acquisitions (herein after acquisitions) are commonplace
in many fragmented markets (Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003; Jain &
Kini, 2006). Low interest rates, rising stock prices, and an abundance
of cash is fueling recent acquisition activity, especially in markets
driven by innovation and transformation (KPMG, 2015). Firms acquire
other firms for a multitude of reasons including increasing market
share to raise prices or lower costs (Henderson, 1979), to acquire the
reputation of a firm (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978), as a defensive
measure (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009),
to integrate markets (Sawler, 2005), and to acquire research and
development (R&D) competencies or other resources that the
acquiring firm lacks (Demirbag, Ng, & Tatoglu, 2007; Hirshleifer,
1980). Competitors, collaborators, and firms engaging in both
competition and collaboration (e.g., co‐opetition or co‐opetitors) are
all involved with acquisitions. This is particularly true in the biopharma-
ceutical market sector where newer firms are subject to being acquired
for their resources in exchange for capital (LaMattina, 2011; Mazzola,
Perrone, & Kamuriwo, 2016), with this market sector being viewed as
the most likely to be engaged in near term future acquisition activity
in the United States (KPMG, 2015).
Another commonplace activity for firms in fragmented markets is
the initial public offering (IPO) process. An IPO represents a different
means of raising capital for investors to that of being acquired and isone of the most consequential events in the life of a firm (Celikyurt,
Sevilir, & Shivdasani, 2010a). In an IPO, the firm sells a portion of its
stock to the general public for the first time. In addition to providing
an infusion of capital, firms undertake an IPO for various reasons.
These reasons include increasing public awareness of the firm and its
products, creating a market value for the firm, increasing financial
transparency, minimizing the cost of capital, lessening dependence
on other investors, and as an exit vehicle for founders and other early
investors (Celikyurt, Sevilir, & Shivdasani, 2010b; Kim & Weisbach,
2008; Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). Despite raising capital in
an IPO, many biopharmaceutical firms that have gone public eventually
end up being acquired by other firms (Mazzola et al., 2016; Williams,
2013) or acquiring other firms (Celikyurt et al., 2010a). Yet we know
little about firms that go public and then later are acquired (Brau
et al., 2003; Celikyurt et al., 2010b; Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes, 2009).
The present study examines the acquisition of recent biopharma-
ceutical IPOs and their relationships prior to the acquisition from a
resource‐based view. Specifically, the study seeks to determine (a)
the likelihood of firms with greater resources being acquired, (b) if
certain types of resources are more likely to lead to acquisition, and
(c) given their resources, if those firms acquired are more likely to be
acquired by collaborators, competitors, or co‐opetitors.
By addressing these questions, this study contributes to the extant
literature in three important ways. First, this study adds to the
resource‐based view as applied to acquisitions by operationalizing,
empirically testing, and comparing different resources within this
context. Second, we examine the understudied area of IPO
acquisitions (e.g., Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, & Santoro, 2008; Williams,
2013). Much of this literature focuses on the financial aspects of the
acquired firm (e.g., Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007; Reuer, Tong, & Wu,
2012; Zambuto, Nigro, & O'Brien, 2017); whereas, we examine the
acquired firm's other resources. Third, we focus on the collaborative/
competitive/co‐operative nature of who is acquiring biopharmaceuti-
cal IPOs relative to the resources within the acquired firm and region,
of which there is insufficient research. The study's overarching premise
is that firms with greater resources are more likely to be acquired, with
different types of resources leading to being acquired by different
types of firms (e.g. collaborators, competitors).
The biopharmaceutical market sector presents an appropriate
context for this study for several reasons. The sector is a growing
and significant portion of recent IPOs (Ernst & Young, 2014) and
acquisitions are prevalent (Danzon, Epstein, & Nicholson, 2007;
Hoffman & Plumridge, 2014; Po, 1998). Also, the sector is fragmented,
being more likely to have acquisitions than a consolidated market
sector (Brau et al., 2003). Part of the reason for acquisitions in this
market sector is due to the decrease in internal drug development of
large biopharmaceutical firms (Pammolli, Magazzini, & Riccaboni,
2011), which are increasingly seeking external sources of replenish-
ment for their clinical pipelines (Banerjee & Martin, 2015; Kneller,
2010). Acquisitions of new firms in this market sector also may be
viewed as less risky compared with internal discovery and develop-
ment efforts (Curtin, 2014). Regardless of industry, IPOs are frequently
subject to acquisitions (Celikyurt et al., 2010a).
New biopharmaceutical firms also rely heavily on other biophar-
maceutical firms to fund their innovations (Lerner & Merges, 1998).
In addition to acquiring the entire firm, these funding arrangements
often take the form of equity alliances, joint ventures, or in‐licensing
agreements—what we collectively term collaborations. These collabo-
rations are multidirectional as both established and new biopharma-
ceutical firms are seeking to secure mutually complementary assets
(Hagedoorn, 1993; Zambuto et al., 2017). Given this, Billitteri, Lo
Nigro, and Perrone (2013:110) observe that the resource‐based view
underscores how partners bring into collaborative arrangements “their
valuable resources and through the alliance they are interested both in
acquiring their partners' valuable resources and in protecting their own
resources during the alliance‐making process.” From this perspective
investors and collaborators act as resources for the firm or as Lavie
(2006: 638) notes “alliance partners play a significant role in shaping
the resource‐based competitive advantage of the firm.” With the
exception of trade press announcements, we know very little about
the acquisition of biopharmaceutical IPOs. The present study should
add to our understanding related to the nature of mergers and
acquisitions associated with biopharmaceutical IPOs with it being of
interest to both scholars and practitioners.2 | THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The resource‐based view (RBV) of the firm (e.g., Barney, 1991;
Penrose, 1959) suggests that competitive advantage for a firm stems
from the resources it controls. From this perspective, the firm is a
collection of its resources (Penrose, 1959). Firms engage in both
collaborations and acquisitions to amass resources. These resourcesmay include technologies of the biotechnology firm, the managerial
competencies of both collaborating firms, social capital of its stake-
holders, and the financial capital needed to fund the enterprise
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008). These resources, however, must be
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and imperfectly substitutable
(Barney, 1991) in order to generate above normal rents. For U.S.
biopharmaceutical firms, patents, for one, grant resources the
conditions of rare, imperfectly imitable, and imperfectly substitutable
(Williams, 2013), with the market determining their value. Hence, prior
research on patents suggests that they can be a valuable resource for
competitive advantage and predictive of overall firm performance
(Powers & McDougall, 2005).
Other factors may be viewed as valuable resources, which lead to
competitive advantage and/or acquisition. In rapidly evolving market
sectors, collaborations have emerged as a critical facilitator of knowl-
edge acquisition (Zambuto et al., 2017). Due to the high cost of R&D
(DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007), new biopharmaceutical firms frequently
collaborate with other firms for the development and market approval
of new patentable drugs (Banerjee & Martin, 2015). Collaborations
occur both before and after the IPO and can act as a firm‐specific
resource. The biopharmaceutical industry exhibits the highest collabo-
ration activity of any industry previously studied by scholars
(Rothaermel, 2001). Although acquisitions and collaborations can be
viewed as strategic substitutes for one another (Sawler, 2005), these
initial collaborative arrangements often lead to the investing firm later
acquiring the other firm. Collaborations are attractive as they provide a
high degree of flexibility for the firm while limiting resource commit-
ments (Klossek, Meyer, & Nippa, 2015) and may also signal resource
quality (Mazzola et al., 2016). Collaborations can take various forms
with the form of in‐licensing of patents or technology being among
the most common for biopharmaceutical firms.
In‐licensing is where the owner of the rights (i.e., the licensor) of
a patent grants permission to use (i.e., a license) technology to another
(i.e., the licensee) and receives compensation in return for granting this
right. In other words, in in‐licensing, the resources or assets of one firm
are appropriable to another firm (Grant, 1996). The initial owner of the
rights may retain certain rights such as the ability to exploit the
technology itself (i.e., a sole license), for a specific application (e.g.,
human, plant, and animal), or for a geographic area. For this transfer
of rights, the licensor is either compensated at the beginning of the
granting of permission to use the technology, during development (e.
g., milestone payment), or once the product reaches the market (e.g.,
royalty payment). Combinations of payment mechanisms frequently
occur. Firms are sometimes acquired to gain access to the other rights
associated with a patent that they do not control. Thus, a collaborating
firm may wish to later acquire an additional right associated with one
or more patents with the acquisition of the firm itself being the most
efficacious method.
Technologies such as patents represent codified knowledge
(Ter Wal, 2014). Codified knowledge is a resource that can be
readily tradable. Noncodifiable knowledge resides with the personnel
or other resources (such as owners) of the firm (Howells, 2012) and
is not readily tradable. Noncodifiable knowledge can be individual
specific, industry specific, and general (Williams, 2013). Knowledge
has long been viewed as a resource that may lead to competitive
advantage for firms (Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004). In this
sense, it is the nontradable resources that are of value. The desire to
acquire nontradable resources is another reason that leads many
firms to acquire other firms in their entirety, as they cannot gain
access to this knowledge or resource by way of collaboration. RBV
suggests that mergers and acquisitions can be an effective means
of transferring nontradable resources and capabilities between firms
(James, 2002).
Additionally, as noncodified knowledge exists in individuals, it
is not very mobile in space (Breschi & Lissoni, 2009). Thus,
knowledge tends to cluster in certain regions where knowledge
workers reside. Scholars for some time (e.g., Ewers & Wettmann,
1980; Porter, 1998) have noted that knowledge has clustered in
various market sectors such as biotechnology (e.g., Zaheer &
George, 2004), opto‐electronics (e.g., Hendry & Brown, 2006), and
telecommunications (e.g., Ibrahim, Fallah, & Reilly, 2009), among
others.
This clustering of like firms in regional markets furthers the devel-
opment of social networks (Cohen & Fields, 1999; Eisingerich, Bell, &
Tracey, 2010). These social networks facilitate the transfer of knowl-
edge within clusters (Eisingerich et al., 2010). Much of the clustering
literature supposes that geographic closeness enables the exchange
of knowledge (Zaheer & George, 2004), especially noncodified knowl-
edge among firms (Bell & Zaheer, 2007). Clusters also benefit from
regional institutions that assist in the coordination and management
of network knowledge and support interaction and learning (Zaheer
& George, 2004). Knowledge transfers can occur through the labor
market, social networks, and collegial collaborations and through
contractual agreements such as formal collaboration arrangements,
in‐licensing agreements, and product or technology acquisition
(Breschi & Lissoni, 2009). Elements associated with clusters we call
regional resources. By residing in a cluster, firms may gain knowledge
and, thus, access in terms of acquisition of other firms.
Early investors in a firm may have more knowledge of the firm
than others. Early investors of biopharmaceutical IPOs include other
biopharmaceutical firms and venture capitalists (Diestre &
Rajagopalan, 2012; Williams, 2013). Venture capitalists initially may
be attracted to firms with greater resources, but they also are a
resource as they act as a key component in the development of
new firms, social networks, and clusters (Gilding, 2008; Kato &
Odagiri, 2012). Through investment in the firm, external investors
gain firm‐specific knowledge. This allows them to assess the value
of the varied resources that the firm may possess and may give
them an elevated position for firm acquisition. These two types of
investors, however, may have different investment objectives and
timeframes. For the venture capitalists, the objective is to maximize
the value of their investment with either an acquisition or IPO
representing a means to liquidate their investment. For a biopharma-
ceutical firm, in addition to capital appreciation, an investment in
another firm may allow them access to knowledge by way of
in‐licensing of additional patents, learning new techniques, or the
opportunity for firm acquisition.
The investment also oftentimes grants the investing firm the
ability to participate on the governing body of the firm (Jain & Kini,
1995; Williams, Duncan, & Ginter, 2010). By participating on theboard, the IPO firm itself gains additional firm‐specific resources in the
knowledge brought to the firm by these two types of investors.
Firm‐specific knowledge bearers (e.g., biopharmaceutical firms and
venture capitalists) also may assist the IPO with understanding
industry‐specific issues (i.e., the patent process, FDA approval process,
and aspects related to being a publicly traded firm). Both biopharma-
ceutical and venture capitalists owners may bring in other biopharma-
ceutical firms as either owners or collaborators. Venture capitalists, for
one, prefer to invest with other venture capitalists in what is known as
syndication (Williams et al., 2010). For the biopharmaceutical IPO,
these firm‐specific resources also may create the opportunity for
acquisitions as venture capitalists seek to “cash‐out” whereas
biopharmaceutical firms seek to “cash‐in” on new resources. Given
the above, we hypothesizeH1 Biopharmaceutical IPOs with greater firm‐specific
resources and regional resources are more likely to be
acquired than biopharmaceutical IPOs with lesser firm‐
specific and regional resources.As mentioned earlier, biopharmaceutical firms make capital com-
mitments in other firms by multiple means. We have identified collab-
oration as both an investment in a technology (e.g., in‐licensing) and
equity ownership in the firm. Here, we delineate further and note that
equity ownership in the firm may grant the owner additional knowl-
edge of the firm, with this being a prime motivation for the investing
firm to do such as opposed to in‐licensing. Firms with equity owner-
ship may be seeking R&D competencies that they currently do not
have and, thus, invest in the firm to gain such knowledge. Established
firms at first do not have to invest large amounts to gain such knowl-
edge. The investment of small amounts in multiple vehicles (i.e., firms),
known as real options, is related in the literature to the resource‐based
view of the firm.
The real option literature “marries the resource‐based view
with industry positioning by disciplining the analysis of the value
of capabilities by a market test” (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001: 745).
This allows firms to invest in several firms simultaneously searching
for new capabilities and technologies (Vassolo, Anand, & Folta,
2004). Or as McGrath and Nerkar (2004: 3) note “by investing
relatively small amounts in learning about several promising
technical directions simultaneously, a firm can broaden the range
of alternatives it can apprehend, generating conceptual variety with
parsimony.”
Furthermore, with equity ownership of new firms often comes
board participation. For an equity investor, board participation allows
the participant to gain insight and also potentially the ability to influ-
ence firm commitments. From this board position, a firm may be able
to learn further from (and reduce uncertainty related to) the invested
firm (Janney & Dess, 2004) without initially making a major capital
commitment. A firm may engage in such activity to not only learn
new knowledge and develop new technologies but also to improve
its core business (McGrath, 1997). Given this, an investing biopharma-
ceutical firm may not wish other firms to collaborate or acquire the
firm. Hence, equity ownership may give a favored status position to
the owner of the equity to other types of relationships. Thus, we
hypothesize
H2 Biopharmaceutical IPOs with a greater percentage of
equity ownership by other biopharmaceutical firms are
more likely to be acquired than firms with a greater
number of biopharmaceutical firm collaborators.As collaborators, competitors, and co‐opetitors acquire IPOs, it
would be reasonable to assume that the firm specific and regional
resources would favor or be associated with different types of
acquirers. This is to say that biopharmaceutical firms investing in other
firms (i.e., the IPO firm) would be more amenable to selling to a firm
that is collaborating with the IPO as opposed to a firm having no
relationship with the IPO or is competing with the IPO.
Gnyawali and Park (2009) note that short product life cycle,
technological convergence and high R&D costs lead to co‐opetition
among firms, which are all present in the biopharmaceutical market
sector. Co‐opetition is oftentimes considered extremely risky as
competitors have separate business incentives that might lead to
opportunistic behavior (Ritala & Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2009). For
example, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) suggest that due to their
initially weak bargaining position, smaller firms tend to cede a dispro-
portional amount of control rights to the financier of the R&D arrange-
ment. Moreover, as firms engaged in co‐opetition seek to leverage
resources and as the nature of the arrangement changes over time
(Morris, Kocak, & Özer, 2007), the co‐opetitive nature of the relation-
ship may also create additional defensive (Haleblian et al., 2009) and
integrative (Sawler, 2005) incentives to acquire the IPO compared to
a firm with no relationship or one that is collaborating. Thus, we
hypothesizeH3 For biopharmaceutical IPOs that are acquired, firms
with greater firm‐specific and regional resources will more
likely be acquired by firms engaged in co‐opetition than
being acquired by collaborators or competitors.3 | METHODS
We collected names of biopharmaceutical firms going public in the
United States from January 1996 through December 2012 from
several Internet sources including biospace.com, hoovers.com, and
SEC.gov (Securities and Exchange Commission). We selected
biopharmaceutical firms with standard industrial classification (SIC)
codes 2833 (Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products), 2834
(Pharmaceutical Preparations), 2835 (In Vitro and In Vivo Diagnostic
Substances), 2836 (Biological Products), 3829 (Measuring and
Controlling Devices), 3841 (Surgical and Medical Instruments and
Apparatus), 5122 (Wholesale Drugs), 7371 (Computer Programming
Services), 7389 (Business Services), and 8731 (Commercial Physical
and Biological Research). For the non‐2000 level SIC codes, we
verify via their SEC forms that they are primarily engaged in the
biopharmaceutical market sector. We found 253 firms went public
during this time. We then used the various stock exchanges
(NASDAQ, NYSE) to determine which firms were still trading as of
the end of 2014. For the firms that we identified as stopping trad-
ing, we examined their SEC registration termination filings and other
SEC filings to determine the reason for termination or de‐listing.Firms de‐list as a result of financial distress or being merged or
acquired. Of the 253 firms, 116 or 46% were acquired.
We perform both binomial logistic regression and multinomial
logistic regression analyses to test our hypotheses. We use time‐
series–cross‐section data. For both tests, the control and independent
variables used data from the firm's prospectus and last annual report
(10 K) prior to its registration termination. In all of our models, we
use natural logs of the total assets and age of the IPO just prior to
the acquisition as control variables. We use a natural log of the number
of patents and a natural log of the amount of research and develop-
ment spent, both in the year prior to the IPO. We also control for when
the firm went public (Date) by dividing the date into four equal time
periods, noting earlier IPOs are more likely to be acquired.
For our independent variables, we use several different measures
found in the firms' prospectus. We use Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital
(1999) to determine if an investor is a venture capital firm and the
percentage of that ownership. We also note the percentage ownership
by other biopharmaceutical firms. We note the number of collabora-
tors at the time of the IPO. Venture capital ownership, biopharmaceu-
tical ownership, and number of collaborators are log transformed after
adding a small quantity to the variables. Venture capital, biopharma-
ceutical, and collaborators are proxies for firm‐specific resources. For
regional resources, we use Powell, Koput, Bowie, and Smith‐Doerr's
(2002) nine biopharmaceutical regions or clusters. This is a binary
variable noting if the transferring firm is in a geographic region (1) or
not (0).
Our dependent variable for the binomial logistic regression model
is coded one (1) for the firm being acquired and a zero (0) if not. For the
multinomial regression model, we code there being no named relation-
ship as one (1), the acquiring firm as a named collaborator as two (2),
the acquiring firm as a named competitor as three (3), and the acquiring
firm as both a named collaborator and competitor as four (4). To deter-
mine collaborators and competitors, we searched the firm's annual
report in the year prior to the acquisition. Annual reports have both a
“competition” section and a “collaboration” section. We search these
two sections specifically and perform a word search of the entire doc-
ument seeking to verify if the acquiring firm is either a named collabo-
rator or competitor. We note that the definition of co‐opetition is
ambiguous in the literature (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). For this study
where the acquiring firm was listed both as a collaborator and compet-
itor, we coded the acquiring firm as a co‐opetitor.4 | RESULTS
For the 253 IPOs, the average IPO reported $49.8 million in total
assets and was 7.8 years old as reported in its annual report just prior
to the acquisition. At the time of the IPO, the average firm had 1.9
collaborators and was owned 43.1% by venture capitalists and 8.3%
by biopharmaceutical firms. At the time of the IPO, the average firm
had 26.2 patents and spent about $14.7 million on R&D. Over 15%
(15.5%) of the IPOs were acquired by named collaborators. Nineteen
percent (19.0%) of the IPOs were acquired by named competitors.
Six percent (6.0%) of the IPOs were acquired by firms that were both
named collaborators and competitors. Overall, 81% were in clusters.
TABLE 2 Binary logistic regression results comparing IPOs that are
acquired to IPOs that are not acquired
B SE p value Exp(B)
Age (LN) .414 .285 .145 1.513
Total assets (LN) .134 .111 .228 1.143
Date −.338 .164 .040* .713
Patents (LN) −.137 .211 .516 .872
R&D (LN) −.139 .093 .135 .870
Venture capital (LN) .293 .125 .019* 1.341
Biopharma (LN) .372 .124 .003** 1.451
Collaborators (LN) .101 .300 .736 1.107
Region −.142 .374 .705 .868
Max likelihood 25.852
p value .002
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) .138
Note. IPO = initial public offering. N = 253.
*Data significant at .05.
**Data significant at .01.Table 1 shows the correlations and descriptive statistics of the
variables associated with our 253 firms. We show these data
without the natural log transformations. As we would expect, firms
that went public earlier and had greater biopharmaceutical owner-
ship interest are all significantly correlated with being acquired.
Firms that spent less on R&D prior to the IPO also were correlated
with being acquired.
Table 2 shows the results of our binomial logistic regression model
related to the IPO being acquired. The results indicate a good fit of the
model to the data (model χ2 = 25.852 [p = .002] and Nagelkerke
R2 = .138). In addition to the control variable (Date), our results show
that two firm‐specific variables have statistical significance: the
percentage ownership by both venture capitalists (Venture Capital)
and other biopharmaceutical firms (Biopharma). The first significant
variable indicates that firms that have greater venture capital
ownership are more likely to be acquired than firms having less
venture capital ownership. Given greater venture capital ownership,
the odds of being acquired are 1.341 times larger than the odds of
not being acquired. The second significant variable indicates that firms
having a greater percentage of other biopharmaceutical firm owner-
ship are more likely to be acquired than firms that have less other
biopharmaceutical firm ownership. Given greater biopharmaceutical
firm ownership interest, the odds of being acquired by other firms
are 1.451 times larger than the odds of not being acquired. This result
modestly supports the first part of our first hypothesis that biopharma-
ceutical IPOs with greater firm‐specific resources are more likely to be
acquired than biopharmaceutical IPOs with lesser firm‐specific, but not
the aspect of the hypothesis related to regional resources. The results
support our second hypothesis that biopharmaceutical IPOs with a
greater percentage of equity ownership by other biopharmaceutical
firms are more likely to be acquired than firms with a greater number
of biopharmaceutical firm collaborators.
Table 3 shows the results of our multinomial logistic regression
analysis. In this model, we are testing the differences among IPOs that
are acquired by firms that either were named as collaborators,
competitors, both, or not named at all. The results indicate a good fit
of the model to the data (Model χ2 = 62.369 [p = .000] and Nagelkerke
R2 = .476).TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Mean SD (1) (2)
(1) Acquisition .460 .499 —
(2) Age 7.830 5.174 .020
(3) Total assets 16.740 1.430 −.037 .426**
(4) Date 2.37 1.033 −.224** .025
(5) Patents 26.244 195.358 .058 .157*
(6) R&D 14689880 196055690 −.153* .152*
(7) Venture capital 43.057 28.999 .071 −.062
(8) Biopharma 8.254 17.604 .166** −.038
(9) Collaborators 1.900 2.258 .070 .052
(10) Cluster or region .810 .396 −.031 −.068
Note. All data shown without natural log transformations. N = 253.
*Data significant at .05.
**Data significant at .01.Our first three panels compare IPOs acquired by collaborators,
IPOs acquired by competitors, IPOs acquired by those engaged in
co‐opetition to IPOs acquired by firms with no named relationship in
the annual report prior to the acquisition. These first three panels do
not directly test our hypotheses, but are provided for informational
purposes as individuals may wish to know how our dependent
variables compare with firms that are acquired by those with no
relationships. Our fourth panel compares IPOs acquired by collabora-
tors to IPOs acquired by competitors. Our fifth panel compares IPOs
acquired by collaborators to IPOs acquired by those engaged in
co‐opetition. The sixth panel compares IPOs acquired by competitors
to those engaged in co‐opetition.
The first panel, for example, Log (PCOL/N), shows two variables
with statistically significant relationships between IPOs acquired by
collaborators compared with IPOs acquired by firms with no relation-
ship with the IPO. Our findings show that if IPOs were to increase
the percentage of ownership held by venture capitalists at the time
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collaborator compared with being acquired by a firm without a
relationship with the IPO would be expected to decrease by .456 units
while holding all other variables in the model constant. In other words,
firms with greater amounts of venture capital ownership at the time of
the IPO are less likely to be acquired by collaborating firms than firms
with no named relationships. Our findings also show that if IPOs were
to increase the number of collaborators at the time of the IPO by one,
the multinomial log‐odd of being acquired by a collaborator compared
with being acquired by a firm without a relationship with the IPO
would be expected to increase by 6.988 units while holding all other
variables in the model constant. In other words, firms with larger
numbers of collaborators at the time of the IPO are more likely to be
acquired by collaborating firms than firms with no named relationships.
The second panel, for example, Log (PCOM/N), shows one variable
with statistically significant relationships between IPOs acquired by
competitors and IPOs acquired by firms with no relationship with the
IPO. Our findings show that if the date increased by one, the multino-
mial log‐odd of being acquired by a competitor compared with being
acquired by a firm without a relationship with the IPO would be
expected to increase by 2.223 units while holding all other variables
in the model constant. In other words, firms that are further away from
the IPO in terms of time are more likely to be acquired by competitor
firms than firms with no named relationships.
The third panel, for example, Log (PCOO/N), shows two variables
with statistically significant relationships between IPOs acquired by
co‐opetitors and IPOs acquired by firms with no relationship with the
IPO. Our findings show that if IPOs were to increase the percentage
ownership by other biopharmaceutical firms by one, the multinomial
log‐odd of being acquired by a co‐opetitor compared with being
acquired by a firm with no relationship would be expected to increase
by 12.217 units while holding all other variables in the model constant.
In other words, firms with greater biopharmaceutical ownership are
more likely to be acquired by a co‐opetitor than a firm with no
relationship. Our findings also show that if IPOs were to increase the
number of collaborators by one, the multinomial log‐odd of being
acquired by a co‐opetitor compared with being acquired by a firm with
no relationship would be expected to increase by 30.364 units while
holding all other variables in the model constant. In other words, firms
with greater number of collaborators are more likely to be acquired by
a co‐opetitor than a firm with no relationship.
The fourth panel, for example, Log (PCOL/COM), shows one variable
with a statistically significant relationship between IPOs acquired by
collaborators and IPOs acquired by competitors. Our findings show
that if IPOs were to increase the percentage ownership by collaborator
firms by one, the multinomial log‐odd of being acquired by a
collaborator compared with being acquired by a competitor would be
expected to increase by 8.803 units while holding all other variables
in the model constant. In other words, firms with collaborators at the
time of the IPO are more likely to be acquired by a collaborator than
a competing firm.
The fifth panel, for example, Log (PCOL/COO), shows three variables
with statistically significant relationships between IPOs acquired by
collaborators and IPOs acquired by co‐opetitors. Our findings
show that if IPOs were to increase the percentage ownership by
venture capitalists, other biopharmaceutical firms, or firms in abiopharmaceutical region by one, the multinomial log‐odd of being
acquired by a collaborator compared with being acquired by a
co‐opetitor would be expected to decrease respectively by .130,
.089, and .008 units while holding all other variables in the model
constant. In other words, firms with greater venture capital and
biopharmaceutical ownership and those located in a biopharmaceutical
region are less likely to be acquired by a collaborator than a firm
acquired by a co‐opetitor. This supports our third hypothesis that for
biopharmaceutical IPOs that are acquired, firms with greater
firm‐specific and regional resources will more likely be acquired by
firms engaged in co‐opetition than being acquired by collaborators or
competitors.
The sixth panel, for example, Log (PCOM/COO), shows two
variables with statistically significant relationships between IPOs
acquired by competitors and IPOs acquired by co‐opetitors. Our
findings show that if IPOs were to increase the percentage owner-
ship by other biopharmaceutical firms by one, the multinomial
log‐odd of being acquired by a competitor compared with being
acquired by a co‐opetitor would be expected to decrease by
.099 units while holding all other variables in the model constant.
Our findings also show that if IPOs were to increase the number
of collaborating firms by one, the multinomial log‐odd of being
acquired by a collaborator compared with being acquired by a
competitor would be expected to decrease by .026 units while
holding all other variables in the model constant. In other words,
firms with greater biopharmaceutical ownership interests and a
greater number of collaborators at the time of the IPO are less likely
to be acquired by a competing firm than a firm engaged in
co‐opetition. This partially supports our third hypothesis that for
biopharmaceutical IPOs that are acquired, firms with greater firm‐
specific and regional resources will more likely be acquired by firms
engaged in co‐opetition than being acquired by collaborators or
competitors.5 | DISCUSSION
The competitive pressures within the biopharmaceutical market sector
continue to drive the urge to merge (Curtin, 2014; Demirbag et al.,
2007; Heracleous & Murray, 2001). Yet we know little about mergers
and acquisitions in this market sector in general (James, 2002) and less
about firms that have recently gone public (McCracken, 2009). The
present study has sought to increase our knowledge in this area.
Similar to Mazzola et al. (2016), we found tremendous acquisition
activity within this market sector with 46% of the firms being acquired.
Collaborators, competitors, and those engaged in co‐opetition all were
involved in acquiring firms. IPOs with firm‐specific resources were
more likely to be acquired than firms with less firm‐specific resources.
The number of collaborators at the time of IPO is not significantly
indicative of which firms will be acquired. This suggests that firm
specific owners (e.g., venture capitalists and biopharmaceutical firms)
are more important than nonequity owner collaborators that do not
have an equity position in terms of leading to firm acquisition. IPOs
within a regional cluster were just as likely as not to being acquired.
Our findings suggested that for biopharmaceutical firms interested in
acquiring nontradable knowledge by way of firm acquisition, being an
equity owner in the firm is indeed superior to being a collaborator in
terms of being able to later acquire the firm and nontradable
knowledge.
We found that the firm‐specific and regional‐specific attributes
affected who or which types of firms were acquiring the IPOs. Reason-
ably, the more collaborators the acquired firm had at the time of the
IPO led to a greater likelihood of being acquired by a collaborator as
opposed to a firm with no relationship or a competitor. This is interest-
ing as one may wonder why firms with multiple collaborators would
undergo the process of the IPO with all its hurdles, disclosures, costs,
and distractions (Certo et al., 2009; Lee, Bach, & Baik, 2011) only to
be acquired later by a named collaborator. Williams (2013) found that
firms with founders as CEOs were more likely to be acquired after the
IPO, speculating that the founder was using the IPO as a valuation
vehicle. It could be that collaborators are doing likewise—using the
IPO to determine the value of the firm given the multiple parties
(e.g., founders, venture capitalists, and other biopharmaceutical
owners) with interests. Research (e.g., Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; Ravasi
& Marchisio, 2003) suggests IPOs often obtain higher values as
acquisition targets compared to private firms. So in this sense, the
noncollaborative owners (e.g., venture capitalists) may know this and
use the IPO to increase the value of their shares compared to if they
had remained private.
Additionally, we hypothesized that for biopharmaceutical IPOs
that are acquired, firms with greater firm‐specific and regional
resources will more likely be acquired by firms engaged in co‐opetition
than being acquired by firms solely identified as collaborators or
competitors. Our findings support this hypothesis. This may be the
most interesting of our findings as it is indicative of the turbulent
dynamics occurring in both the biopharmaceutical and IPO markets.
Although the number of firms identified as co‐opetitors is small, it
may suggest for those firms acquired that venture capitalists and other
biopharmaceutical firm owners prefer their interests being acquired by
co‐opetitors. If we extrapolate from the previous paragraphs that the
owners are going public to establish a price for the IPO and
co‐opetitors are doubly incentivized, then perhaps, they are paying a
premium for the firm—we do not know, and more research is needed.
Acquisitions may also be the only way that firms engaged in
co‐opetition can fully realize the benefits of collaboration. Within all
types of collaborations, firms construct contractual mechanisms to
limit the opportunism of knowledge flows beyond those intended
(Williamson, 1985). The strength of the varying protection mechanisms
is especially pronounced in collaborations with competitors (Ritala &
Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2013), perhaps beyond those constructs for
noncompetitor collaborators. Thus, acquisitions may be the only way
for co‐opetitors to gain access to additional knowledge or technolo-
gies. Again, we do not know, and more research is needed.
Our study has several managerial implications. For the owner‐
manager of a new firm, venture capital investment may mean not only
loss of control to the venture capitalists prior to the IPO (Williams,
2013), but also loss of control after the IPO via acquisition. Thus, the
owner‐manager's ownership interest (and control) may be diluted at
three points in time: (a) with venture capital involvement, (b) at the
IPO itself, and (c) after the IPO by way of an acquisition. The owner‐manager should consider this prior to receiving venture capital invest-
ment, especially if s/he is expecting the venture capitalist to “cash‐out”
shortly after the IPO with the owner‐manager believing that the
owner‐manager will maintain some control afterward. For the owner‐
manager seeking to have some modicum of control, it may be more
advantageous to receive funding from other biopharmaceutical firms
by way of collaborations than equity acquisition prior to the IPO as
ownership by others is more likely to lead to acquisition than
collaboration.
For most industries, the IPO represents a means to lessen depen-
dence on other investors, but for biopharmaceutical IPOs other (bio-
pharmaceutical) investors may increase the firm's dependence on
them via acquisition. Firms with biopharmaceutical owners should be
aware that they are more likely to be acquired by co‐opetitors than
collaborators. Similarly, for external biopharmaceutical firms seeking
to acquire firms, our results suggest that acquiring an ownership inter-
est in the firm may be a more effective means of achieving this rather
than collaboration. Venture capitalists may also wish to contemplate
these results as they typically exit the firm after the IPO. For them, fur-
ther research is needed to know (a) at what point (i.e., prior to IPO,
post IPO), (b) with what mix (i.e., biopharmaceutical collaborators or
owners), and (c) by whom (e.g., collaborators, competitors, and co‐
opetitors) they maximized their wealth. Our study assists them with
the second and third areas with respect to showing who is acquiring
these firms post IPO.
Our paper has several limitations. First, our sample size is modest
due to the limited time frame and focus on the biopharmaceutical mar-
ket sector—our sample related to firms engaged in co‐opetition is
especially small. Second, because of the size of the data we are unable
to include several other control variables that we would have liked to
include, such as products, expense, net income, working capital, and
accumulated deficits. Third, we did not distinguish between firms that
are merging and surviving from firms that are acquired and become
subsidiaries of larger firms. Fourth, it should be acknowledged that
we used “named competitors,”with perhaps some acquired firms being
reluctant to name an acquiring firm as a competitor. Fifth, we did not
study the effects that merger waves of acquisitions or IPO hot markets
would have on our study. Finally, we study only IPOs within the United
States, noting that the public biopharmaceutical market is increasingly
becoming global in scope (Lawrence & Lahteenmaki, 2014).6 | CONCLUSION
The present paper explores the little studied area related to the nature
of relationships between newly acquired biopharmaceutical IPOs and
the acquiring firm prior to the acquisition. We find great collaborative
and acquisition activities in the sector. We also find that IPOs are
acquired by collaborators, competitors, and co‐opetitors. We find to
some extent, firm‐specific resources affect the prospect that the firm
will be acquired. Furthermore, our findings also show that firms with
more of these resources are likely to be acquired by those firms
engaged in co‐opetition rather than by those solely engaged in collab-
oration, competition, or (to a limited extent) with no prior relationship.
The present study should be of interest to practitioners in the
biopharmaceutical market sector and researchers of bio‐pharmaceuti-
cals, IPOs, mergers and acquisitions, among others.
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